Thursday, August 6, 2009

resource baesd conflicts in tanzania

Download the original attachment

Page 2
The undersigned certifies that he has read and hereby recommends for examination
by the University of Dar es salaam the dissertation titled “Resource based conflicts
in northern Tanzania the case of Sonjo and Masaai of Ngorongoro” in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the award of degree of Bachelor of laws (LL.B)
Of the University of Dar es salaam.
. .………………………………………………
Dr. Khoti Chilomba Kamanga

I, PAUL ONESMO, declare that this dissertation is my own work and it has not
been presented and it will not be presented to any other university for similar or any
other degree award.
Paul, Onesmo
( Candidate )
This dissertation is copyright protected material under the Berne Convention, the
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act of 1999 and other international and national
enactments on intellectual property law. Production by any means, in full or in part,
without the prior written permission of the Directorate of Undergraduate Studies, on
behalf of the author and the University of Dar es salaam, is strictly prohibited,
except for short extracts in fair dealing for research or private study, critical
scholarly review, or discourse with an acknowledgement
Page 4
Despite the great effort I sold to this peace of work, there are few people invariablywere ready to see the success of my work. The author is most grateful to the people who have contributed in one way or the other to the conception, preparation and eventually production of this work. Before all, my special thanks should go to my beloved wife Joyce Japhet Humbe for her moral and material support during my fieldwork, she made my trip to conflicts vicinity possible and she was tolerant of my frequent absence at home. I should as well cast my thanks to my beloved supervisor Dr Khoti Kamanga for his
constructive criticism and friendly supervision that made me to enjoy my work.
Not easy to mention all but the following, also had great role to make my work of high quality. Suzan Rhorer from USA for her moral and financial support, lecturer of law Makumira university Mr Elifurah Laltaika , Program Officer OXFAMTanzania Mr William Olenasha, Melau Alais , Legal Officer Ngorongoro DistrictMr Tluwah Otai, Chairman Ngorongoro District Council Hon S. Soinda , Ngorongoro Police Commissioner Mr. Mponjoli , Coordinator PINGO’S FORUM Mr Edward Parokwa, DC.Ngorongoro Honourable Jowika Kasunga.
Page 5
Ultimately, I have special thanks to almighty God for his love and care, fo
for without his care and guidance nothing would have been achieved.
This dissertation is dedicated to my lovely parents Paul Kasale Olengurumwa and
Priscilla Ngurumwa for love and parental care they showed me before their Passing on .May their souls rest in peace.
Tanzania is increasingly facing resource based conflicts mainly involving herders1 on one hand and farmers on the other hand. Such conflicts sometimes involve herders themselves (Intra-group), farmers or herders and investors. Morogoro, Mbeya, Arusha and Mara regions are notorious for such conflicts because the Ancholi, Wanchari, Sonjo and Maasai live and lead conflicting livelihoods. This research focuses on Ngorongoro District in Arusha Region where the sedentary Sonjo/Batemi and Maasai have historically been in confrontations.
Ngorongoro District is famous both in Tanzania worldwide due to variety of wildlife species. It is also in this District where the Ngorongoro crater which has been categorized as the world heritage sites2. The District divides into three Divisions, which are Loliondo, Ngorongoro, and Sale.
The District has a population of 129,000 people according to the 2002 census, 59% of the District's landmass falls within the famous Ngorongoro Conservation Area, which was established in 1959 to deal with matters related to the conservation of wildlife resources, promotion of tourism and the development of indigenous Maasai pastoralists living in the area.
Loliondo Division, which is divided into a number of wards and villages, is inhabited Mostly by Maasai who are traditionally pastoralist but who now practice farming as well. The Batemi (commonly known as Sonjo) and other groups also live in the area and they are mostly farmers even though they also keep domestic animals. The Division is made up of the villages of Loliondo , Sakala, Ngwarrwa/Enguserosambu, Oloirien/Magaiduru, Soitsambu, Ololosokwan, Oloipir, Arrash and Maaloni.
As for Sale division, most of its residents are agro-pastoralist. The Division is made up of the villages of Tinaga, Mgongo, Kisangiro, Samunge, Yasimdito, Digodigo, Malambo, Piyaya, Pinyinyi and Engaresero. The three Divisions are characterized by differences in natural resources endowments, modes of production, the history and cultures of their inhabitants. There are very complex and hostile socio-economic and political relations between Maasai and the Batemi of the Sale and Loliondo Divisions.
The ethnic relationship between Maasai and Sonjo has historically based on competitions. The utilizations of natural resources have been complimentary, the social activities and beneficial economic co-operation between them are as follows : the vital barter exchange of food as women conduct frequent trade between the communities, Maasai women frequently participate in Sonjo rituals and request from Sonjo priests3 .

The problem grew bigger at the time of making boundaries and formalization of village land in the Loliondo Division. However, at the same time we have to bear in mind that this problem was on track one century ago4. It is therefore misleading to brand name findings of various scholars in 1990’s 5as being the root causes of the problem; rather they are simply factors that facilitate the development of the problem.
Therefore, an assessment of the magnitude of the problem reveals more political and legal struggles with ecological reference. The conflicts as stated earlier are either Intra-group (Maasai vs. Maasai) or Entra-group (Maasai vs. Sonjo), for instance 2 years ago there was a conflict between Maasai clans Loita and Purko in Soit Sambu Ward mainly due the fact that great part of their land have been grabbed by government and granted to outsiders like United Arabs kings from Dubai; Brigadier Mohammad Ally and other companies like Cattle Products Ltd from Kenya and the Tanzania Breweries limited Company (TBL).
Various community meetings were conducted to settle the dispute but no sustainable solution was found. Before a brief of time an order from Ngorongoro District Authority to nullify the certificates of occupancy offered to Loliondo villages in 1990’s.And declared those villages to be resurveyed. Then again worsened the dispute between Sonjo and Maasai.
The rivals of ethnic animosity, tried to end their cattle and land disputes when 25 leaders from each faction signed a peace accord brokered by the Arusha Regional Commissioner, Mohamed Babu in Collaboration with Ngorongoro District Commissioner, Mr. Assey Msangi, District Executive Director (DED) Mr. Nicholaus Kileka, tradional leaders and experts from the Irish Embassy6 . However, with all those efforts still the problem continued and expanded to great magnitude.
This Research aimed to find out the role of laws and national policies in the said conflicts. It also aims at studying why the problem has acquired a persistent nature and why the Government has left the problem unattended for all those years. This research tried to find out, where these fighting groups get small firearms used during the conflicts. The research also addressed the case of illegal immigrants, as it has been associated with the conflict.7
The legal implications of the findings will help the policy and law enforcement organs to have the knowledge and insight of the problem. Such findings will also create awareness to people as to what is taking place in Ngorongoro. In the end, the community will understand sources of conflicts so that possible conflict resolution strategies in areas of heterogeneous communities with plural and land tenure systems will be suggested.

1.03 Statement of the Problem.
The problem has many causes. These are like poor management and
Administration of land ethnic hatreds; scarcity of land and population growth;
Diversification of livelihoods; and the role of politicians and the government bureaucracy. These are some of the causes according to various researchers’ findings. Therefore, the problem has never been looked in legal perspectives.
The main problem in Tanzania is ethnic and resource based between herders and farmers and the situation takes another shape as most of the time even pastoralist themselves have been in hostility. The disputes have been associated with land matters by many writers.
Sanna Ojalammi of Helsinki University8 in his work on semi arid parts of Northern Tanzania has shown that the dispute in Maasai and Sonjo land has relation to land dispute. Being a geographer, he tried to address the problem basing on properties in the changing geopolitical and economic system on varying geographical and historical scales.
The main problem that this research dealt with is the recurrent nature [Endemism] and over growing of these disputes in Ngorongoro. The conflict breaks almost every year and its magnitude became bigger when the Somali and Loita (Maasai from Kenya)9 immigrants took part10. To add salt on the wound, types of arms used are not expected to be used in a local conflict of this nature. Some of the said firearms include SMG, AK 47, RPG, LMG, and Rifle. These conflicts result into death of many people, destruction of their homes and properties like burning of crops and many people women and children ran away from their homes.
The then Ngorongoro District Commissioner Aseri Msangi11 and the former Ngorongoro MP, Mathew Taki ole Timan admitted that the conflict had eventually reached the great intensity of conflicts by considering the type of weapons being used. One of the victims of war also admits the same.12 It therefore appears that the problem receives many new players every year and make it grow bigger and bigger.
The District is rich of natural resources but surprisingly the people on the land still live in extreme poverties. This is what Ragna Tarvick and others baptized it as Resource curse.13They found that resource curse represents enormous impediments to development, yet it is important to understand that natural resources is not a problem, rather it is lack of good governance and democracy. Therefore remedying this institutional failure Ragna14 says we need change of law and practice but doesn’t require huge resource investment.
Despite several attempt to end the animosity still the problem breaks out often. Therefore the endemic nature of this problem with no doubt matured into legal problem to be researched. Only recently it was reported by Kuilikoni News paper of 22/04/2008 that one person named Lesingo Nanyoi (34) was brutally shot by Police Officers in resource based conflict with a foreigner investing on their land at Soitsambu Ward.15. Therefore the problem manifested that there are legal issues to be doubted with, as the combination of causes fueling the problem. The situation then manifests that there are laws or policies tend to collide each other, hence leave people into conflicts. For instance the Loliondo Division villages are recognized by Land laws and Local Government laws but Wild life laws and Policies recognize them as Game controlled area (LGCA).
The following questions were guidelines during research activities.
How does the law and National Policies respectively contribute to these endemic conflicts in Tanzania?
How do the issues of borders make the problem persistent?

Parties to the conflict believe that, the problem could have been contained if Government was serious and firm in addressing the problem. The Maasai pastoralists who constitute the majority and the Sonjo agro-pastoralists who constitute the minority, among other groups, inhabit the District. The two groups have a long history of hostile relations and tensions.16 The history behind the existing conflict goes back to 1975 when the most intense fight between was first recorded. Many lives were claimed in a fight that was triggered by cattle thefts. The conflicting situation was temporarily arrested in the late 70’s when the late Premier Edward Sokoine mediated the same by using traditional means of conflict resolution. 17
The conflict between the two sides gathered new momentum after 1990, when a highly disputed demarcation and issuance of title deeds to some villages, was done by Arusha Development Diocesan Organization (ADDO)), Korongoro Integrated Peoples Oriented to Conservation (KIPOC), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy (SRCS).18 It however blew in 1995 in an occasion where a Maasai young man stole a shoe of a Sonjo trader in a local market, an incidence that quite surprisingly exploded in bloodshed of a magnitude not seen to date.
While the problem was not yet solved , the village land at Olososokwan with a long term licensed permit was granted to private non Tanzania in 1993 from United Arabs Emirates (UAE). 19 Then, citizens living in Loliondo Game Controlled Area (LGCA) created an open conflict due to the indigenous land dispossessions. Several debates were made questioning the property right of the Indigenous. This was followed by complains that the Government has not given the conflict its due weight to end it.
The co – existence of the two groups of people have always reflected certain ambiguity ranging from hostility to administration surrounding forest of Loita hills. Ole Nangoro in his book20 said that, the land dispute prevalent in Loliondo and Sale division occurred in the borderland area or in wildlife conservation area, such as Loliondo game controlled area, the most heavy violent disputes took place from 1980`s, involving heavy raiding, theft, by armed bandits destruction of homes, property and death of many.21
The field seems to be new to many writers but in the course of this readings I have managed to visit various publications that correlate to this matter and managed to find few authors as follows.
Sanna Ojalammi 22 deals with specific land disputes, which took place in 1990 in the Loliondo and Sale Divisions of Ngorongoro. The author being the geographer shows that territoriality, boundary, property and relations of power in geographical space as being the main reasons for the problems. He further opines that the reason behind the problem is the lack of communal land rights since the existing one is based on the English property law systems. However, as stated earlier on, these cannot be the root causes of the problem since the problem started many years before those transformations.
On his part, Shivji23 propounds that from 1990’S lands disputes have become common in Tanzania due to poor management of land matters.
Territoriality is an important part of social relations and implies the existence of equal social relations on deferent geography scales propounded by Holloway24. Therefore this defines human territoriality within this study as an attempt to effect influence or control actions, interactions (of people, things and relationship) by asserting and attempting to enforce control over specific geographical areas. Therefore what I noted is how this principle is applied or enforced sometime Government used it as the weapon to grab the land of the poor.
Blomley25 is of the opinion that law has a geographical aspect because it is formalized, implemented and enforced within a specific context. Generally law and property are both geographical and political. This is an assertion by Mustafa26 who says that law and state apparatus are inextricably linked in the process of production of social special patens of access to resources and empowerment of certain social agents in the process
Blomley 27 says that state has a legal monopoly over the land territory through legal enactments. In principle, law should provide tools for administrations and judicial procedure to protect the land rights.
The study shows the multiple legal situation in Tanzania, whereby land and resource property has accommodated notions of private, common /collective or granted law in land ownership in the beginning of the 1990’s. State law also lagged decades behind states policy changes. Tenga, 28 went on saying that changes in law and property have taken place with force and violence ever since the colonial time example the land ordinance 1923 remodified and re- co -structuring the local systems of customary land tenure from 1921 on wards.
Peter Maina29 says the 1997 Tanzania Investment Act has some glaring weakness like liberation of economy hailed as policy that will open avenues through which the local and foreign investors would walk together to prosperity but this has not been achieved because the law is silent on the joint ventures and obligation to investors.
Lane’s study (1991)30 shows that the disruption of the Barbeig people’s land use and their pastoral economic was due to allocated lands grant to National Food Cooperation (NAFCO) and Canada Tanzania wheat Programme.
Other writers like Potkanski31 argued that Sonjo and Maasai dispute was due to competitions over water, he made a study and found the resource based conflict between the two hostile group. Mbonile32 with the case of Pangani Basin says that immigrations of people should be taken as the major cause of resource based conflicts. 33
Mustafa34 argues that law can be contingent, political and contestable often perpetuating and legitimizing exploitative and oppressive geographies of social power.
Some people have translated to mean that there was no need to respect boundaries and it was great incentive to lawlessness. These local boundary problems seem to be maximized by conflict between customary law and land law.
Babiker 35 says the existing policies and legal institutional framework were put in place in 1950s and the tensions between the state legislations in Sudan and customary land regimes and continual grabbing of land and displacement of pastoralists was leading for conflicts among pastoralists, commercial farmers, sedentary farmers and state security forces.
The reasons behind the problem seem to be the state intervention by grabbing the land, imposing hard and unknown laws, squarely with unfair formulated policies to majority. Citizens from the grass root are not involved in policy making.
The Overlapping and failure of the following laws around and within the disputed areas, “the Local Government Laws, Forest Laws, Land Laws, Conservation Law, Environmental Law Wildlife Laws and Laws of Immigrations” manifested to be key players to the problem.
The rights to exercise permanent sovereignty over natural resources have been put in jeopardy. The parasitic stratum between Investors through Government manifests how Natural resource curse play a role to endlessly resource based conflicts in Tanzania and Africa in general.

The case study area was the Sale Division and Loliondo Division in Ngorongoro district. This study has been substantively selected due to the following reasons. The area has been historically facing the dispute between Maasai and Sonjo/Batemi and sometime Maasai themselves. The following villages are victims of conflicts. Loosoito, Malon, Eyasi/Mdito(Sonjo), Kisangoro( Sonjo) ,Mughole (Sonjo) and Nga’rwa. The dispute most of the time breaks along the border land areas of these villages and wildlife conservation area like Loliondo Game Controled Area.
Substantive field research was conducted to generate primary. Participatory methodologies were employed, such as interviews, questionnaire, and story telling and group discussion. The field work meant to meet Government officials, communities and civil society operating in the area. These methods have been selected because of the nature of the area and people. Sometime you need to meet elders and have group discussion with them and have their testimonies as they have long experience of the conflicts, questionnaires were directed to Police officers, leaders and district council officers. Library research was used as another method of collecting data, libraries visited including University of Dar es Salaam libraries.

2.01 Introduction
Policies and laws are the tools that a society, through the institutions of Government, use to regulate the use, management, and ownership of its resources. It is important, however, to distinguish between the purposes and functions of a policy, on the one hand, and a law, on the other. A policy describes the objectives and aims for a given sector such as land, education, health care, etc. A policy describes how the management of a sector will be organized, what roles different stakeholders will play, and the principles that should govern decision-making.
Laws determine the rights possessed by different institutions and individuals. Laws provide the penalties for violating their provisions and provide guidance for courts to enforce them; laws also restrict any kind of illegal practice. Courts in terms of interpreting laws, by contrast, can only use policies.
At the same time laws and National policies in deferent places and time can be seen as the factor behind ending conflicts within our communities. This can be manifested from initial point of policy formulation and implementation of the law. To reveal this, the following laws and national policies in relation Resource based conflict in Tanzania were revised: Mustafa36 argues that law can be contingent, political and contestable, often perpetuating and legitimizing exploitative and oppressive geographies of social power.
These local boundary problems seem to be maximized by conflict between customary law, Wild life law and Land law.
2.02 Land Law and National Land Policy.
According to the National Land Policy of 1995, all land is public and the President is the trustee on behalf of all citizens. The policy identifies several land categories like general land, reserve land (Over 25 % of Tanzania’s land mass is devoted to national parks, most of which are at present delineated from the general land) and village land. General land, which includes unoccupied or unused, is currently the one available to pastoralists for grazing their animals and smallholder farmers for harvesting forage. However, the land can always be allocated to reserves, national parks or villages to the pastoralist’s disadvantage.
The land has for several decades been shrinking through reallocation and expansion of cultivation while livestock population has increased. There are very few, if any, areas that have been set aside and protected by law for communal grazing lands for pastoral communities, to add salt to the wound Tanzania 1997 Investment Act provided all lands for investors. No effective land use planning and village land gazettement have been undertaken and this has allowed processes of encroachment to develop unabated.
Tanzanian Land law, prior to 1895, was under customary rule by respective tribes or communities. In 1895, following the onset of German colonial rule, an Imperial Decree was issued on Land. After 1920 the British administration began passing several laws to govern, land including the Land Ordinance Cap 113 in 1923. This law governed land in Tanganyika/Tanzania until May 1, 2001, when the Land Act No. 4 of 1999 and the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 came into operation. This has provided a new framework for Land tenure in Tanzania. 37
The Land Act of 1999 and Village Act of 1999 now govern all land in Tanzania. These laws state that all land is public land vested in the President as trustee on behalf of the country’s citizens land is divided into three categories: reserved land, village land, and general land, which are managed according to differing provisions.38
The acts provide for different powers in different Government institutions, including the President, the Commissioner, and the Minister for Lands. District Councils and Village Councils also have powers for land management, and the latter are the principle management institution for village lands. Dispute settlement institutions are also provided for in terms of different courts and a new village institution, the Village lands Council, as well as a District Land and Housing Tribunal.
A number of central aspects of land tenure also remain relatively unchanged as compared to the situation under the Land Ordinance, including:39 The corpus of land tenure regime developed during the colonial times continued to apply fully after independence with only one change: ‘President’ replaced ‘Governor’
All land in Tanzania remains public land under the President.
Village land management remains under community authority.
The President retains the authority to revoke rights of occupancy in the public interest (subject to compensation).
Land tenure is still defined by either granted rights of occupancy or customary rights of occupancy (now defined as equal under the law).
Many people are not aware of the existence or content of the new legislation.
A number of the new institutions do not exist and their formation will be time-consuming.
Certain new institutions, such as the District Land and Housing Tribunal, are not provided for in terms of composition by the laws and not found down to people .
Prior to the new land acts, Tanzania had already adopted a National Land Policy in 1995, which the country had not previously had in the years since independence. A number of land management problems spurred the adoption of the Land Policy, including population growth, increasing demand for agricultural land, expansion of urban areas, need for investment, increasing disputes over land, the need for a land market, and uncertainty in land tenure in rural areas. The National Land Policy is concerned primarily with four key issues: land allocation, land ownership, land use, and land dispute settlement. However, it also touches on fundamental issues such as land management and administration, rights of women to use and own land, land use and conservation, land transfers or sales, land acquisition, revocation of rights of occupancy and compensation, land dispute settlements, documentation of land rights, and surveying and mapping.
2.03 Forest Law, Wild Life Law and Policy
The documentation and legislation supports forestry activities in Tanzania, including Forest legislation from 1957, the Tanzania Forest Action Plans from the 1980’s and 1990’s, the National Environment Action Plan of 1994, and the National Environmental Policy of 1997. In 1998 the National Forest Policy was released, and in 2001 the Ministry published Community-based Forest Management Guidelines.
The management of Tanzania’s wildlife resources has for the past quarter century been based on the legal content of the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974. The Wildlife Conservation Act represents the ‘fences and fines’ approach to wildlife management. The two core elements of the Act are:
Provisions for establishing and managing protected areas such as Game Reserves and Game Controlled Areas.
Provisions for regulating the use and consumption of wildlife and wildlife products.

Game Controlled Areas are described in the Wildlife Conservation Act as areas where hunting is regulated by the Director of Wildlife. No restrictions are placed on the land uses of people living in Game Controlled Areas- only their rights to use and consume wildlife resources. By contrast, in Game Reserves restrictions are placed on entry, cutting of vegetation, and grazing of livestock.40
The Wildlife Conservation Act provides the legal framework for regulating the main form of wildlife utilization in Tanzania, which is tourist hunting. Tourist hunting is carried out in much of the nation in areas such as Game Reserves, Game Controlled Areas, and Open Areas. The basis of tourist hunting management is that the Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism leases a block- a designated hunting area in reserved or village land- to a commercial tourist hunting company.
The Policy describes the problems facing the wildlife sector as including:
The failure of wildlife conservation as a form of land use to compete adequately with other forms of land use, especially for rural communities.
The loss of wildlife habitats to settlement, agriculture, grazing, mining and logging due to human population increase.
Escalating illegal wildlife off-take and trade.
The existing land tenure system and the wildlife resource ownership by the State hinder investment in and development of wildlife-related industry by the private sector.
Inadequate wildlife user rights granted to rural communities.
These legal opportunities have existed for years. Local communities have not used them due to the dominance of the state-centered conservation paradigm, which restricted Community participation in wildlife and natural resource management.
The current policy also does not adequately recognize the transhumant, or nomadic, nature of many communities living within or near wildlife areas and Tanzania's protected estate. Pastoralism in semi-arid environments requires regular movement and flexibility in order to utilize the different climate-driven resource niches this as been proclaimed even by Potkanski41
2.04 Investment Law and Policy.
A number of developing countries recently have been busy enacting laws and amending the existing one in order to provide incentives to investors and giving them a red carpet treatment. 42
The main objective of Tanzania investment policy in tourism industry is to expand a diversify tourism industry, encourage foreign and local investors, On the other hand this is not what is in the practice, local investors are ignored and indigenous do not benefit from their resources, only foreign investors investing on their land. The only song by government leaders is that pastoralist are enemies of environment which is quite wrong as it’s all known pastoralism and wild life coexist.43
No promotion and equitable growth through the country. Peter44 said the Tanzania investment Act 1997 No 26 was aimed to attract foreigners to invest in our country and few local people got in by accident. Under 1997 Act everything is up for grabs without any inhibition, the 1990 investment promotion Act45 which was repealed by 1997 Act, was some how fair to our land as it indicated reserved areas for public activities.
2.05 Firearms Laws and Policies.
The problem of the proliferation, misuse and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons in Tanzania has had a tangled history due to the country’s unique geographic location and its role in African liberation wars. During the 1970s and 1980s, Tanzania was the centre of liberation movements for Southern African countries that were under colonial rule. Tanzania offered military training to freedom fighters belonging to these movements. However, these liberation movements also had their own command and organizational structures and were solely responsible for the distribution of small arms, light weapons and ammunition to their troops without interference by the host country. Other reasons behind, is Tanzania being surrounded by war torn countries.
Tanzania doesn’t have an effective legislation to eradicate the illicit trade of firearm. The Arms and Ammunition Act of 1991 regulates the acquisition of firearms in Tanzania. A license or permit is required for all types of firearms, and there are mandatory waiting periods, training certifications and background checks. Tanzania is also signatory of the Nairobi Declaration on the problem of the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.46
Grace, Mujuma a Tanzania delegates to United Nation General Assembly 47 said that, following the adoption of the 2001 Programme of Action, her country had formed its own national strategy and joined other regional initiatives including the SADC Firearms protocol.48 In 2003, the Government reviewed its national firearms legislation to ensure that it was in line with the Programme and the SADC initiative. It had also committed resources to addressing the development-related aspects of the illegal small arms trade, which fuelled conflict and hindered socio-economic development and, in war-torn areas, hindered humanitarian access.
The United Republic of Tanzania believed that efforts to track the spread of the weapons would be greatly improved, with the adoption of an internationally binding agreement. And, while some instruments of a political nature and character had been somewhat helpful, it was clear that more needed to be done.49

3.01 The issue of international border and illegal immigrations.
Loliondo and Sale Divisions of Ngorongoro District closely border Narok County Council in neighboring Kenya. The nature of people living across this international boundary is almost the same. People found in Kenya Masaai region are almost the same people found in Loliondo divisions. The 3 Maasai clans who are Loita, Purko and Laitayok commonly found on the land of both countries. The territory of Loita Maasai of Tanzania is a part of the greater Loita territory, which extends deeply into Kenya. Artificial borders50 created by colonial masters have theoretically remained. The Loita continue to move across borders as if they did not exist in the first place.
This situation has been further complicated by the factor of illegal arms, attributed to illegal trade with Somali bandits who flocked the district in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Guns have been used in recent conflicts, raising the stakes for both the protagonists and local administration officials. It is also observed that the Batemi are more militaristic than the Maasai, with a number of Batemi having been members of the armed forces.51
There are claims that during skirmishes between the two sides, Kenyan Loita Maasai are ferried across the border to fight the Batemi. A further complication comes from the proximity of this area to the border with Kenya, and the fact that the Loita Maasai traverse this border to Loliondo on the Tanzania side
Moreover52, the Batemi claim that additional pressure on land and natural resources comes from the large number of Kenyan Loita Maasai who have migrated into Loliondo division. Furthermore, the informal and unregulated cross-border trade that constitutes a major component of the local economy on both sides of the border is controlled largely by the Loita, as a result of which the agricultural produce of the Batemi has often failed to find market as they would have to cross over ‘enemy’ territory on both sides of the border53.
We can therefore say with nature of people living in Loliondo and sales divisions the laws of migrations have failed to accommodate the nature of this problem around this international boundary.

How this contributes to persistent nature of the conflicts?
Proliferation of Firearms.
The same border is freely used by both Sonjo and Maasai to import illegal firearms to be used during the conflicts.54 OCD during interview said that, up to July 2008 Loliondo Police station managed to receive surrendered fire arms 18 in total and these are SMG.SAR, AK 47 and G3 from Arash,Oldosambu,Kisangiro,Oloirien,Yasimdito,Oloipiri,Enguserosambu and Maaloni.
SMG NO.3321
Enguserosambu village
SMG NO.56-13009895
Maaloni village
SAR NO. 25032510
Eyasi Mdito
SMG NO.6049924
Compiled From Data Provided by Ngorongoro OCD Mr. Mponjoli
The proliferation of firearms is associated with Kenya Fire arms policy during 1980’s where the policy in Kenya by then allowed every Kenyan to posses firearms purposely to fight common enemies who were the Somali bandits. There are many people who posses firearms illegally from neighboring country.
The use of firearms has risen to alarmingly high levels in Kenya during the past decade, a trend blamed on the easy availability of small arms, mostly pistols and assault rifles55. Armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa, especially in Somalia, some parts of Ethiopia and the Great Lakes region, have been cited as one way through which illegal guns have fallen into the hands of gangsters and livestock thieves. Eregae56 said most of the weapons used in urban crime, cattle rustling and poaching were smuggled into Kenya from neighboring countries that have experienced civil strife. According to a source within the Kenyan law enforcement, an illegal pistol would sell in some Nairobi suburbs for about 10,000 shillings (US$140). Larger weapons, such as AK-47s, which are not readily available from smugglers in the city, would cost three times more.
Conflicts have been also caused by cultural differences and influx of immigration that have resulted into competition over resources57Also the same border allowed the Somali bandits to cross the border in 1980’s and later became a source of weapons to the fighting groups in Ngorongoro. Mbonile (2003) examines how immigration and other processes have exacerbated the water use problems in the Pangani Basin and have led to a resource-based conflict. Mbonile found that the major processes that have intensified the water conflicts in the Pangani Basin were the high and rapid increases in both human and livestock populations.
Babikeri58 said the disorder, poor policies and insecurity has encouraged pastoralist Gadaref in Sudan to posses arms for deffence.Francis, K59 says the deadly pastoral conflicts in Kenya are further compounded by massive armament and the corresponding rise in civil militarism among pastoralist communities.
3.02 Lack of Land Use Planning and Proper Resource Management
Proper land use planning at both the District and village levels is the major
Contributing factor to such conflicts.60 Certainly one would even suspect the lack of land use planning capacity at district level. The little land use planning that is being done is actually a simple demarcation of boundaries between villages.
Disorder in land tenure and regime61’, is responsible for many conflicts in land in the country. The situation in Ngorongoro and especially in Loliondo and Sale Divisions is a living example of the subject chaotic and disorderly arrangement in land management and administration Sale and Loliondo Divisions have no clear boundaries to the extent that administrators do not even know the geographical limits of their jurisdictions.
There has never been a systematic demarcation of the two Divisions. The boundaries of villages in the two Divisions are consequently contested and are a major cause of the escalating violence. Babiker 62 says the existing policies and legal institutional framework were put in place in 1950s and the tensions between the state legislations in Sudan and customary land regimes and continual grabbing of land and displacement of pastoralists was leading for conflicts among pastoralists, commercial farmers, sedentary farmers and state security forces.
Current law does not define the boundaries between the two conflicting sides. The land regime in our republic knows nothing about tribal land boundaries but village land boundaries. The situation in the two Divisions is such that people do not talk of village boundaries but those of Loita Maasai and the Batemi. The interest of the two groups is to protect and expand their traditional territories, much against the interest of the other.
In Kilosa some of the areas that constitute the District are surveyed or have at least been declared as planning areas. However a large portion of District is unsurveyed ,and as results we now see daily bloodshed in Kilosa.A study by Misana and other (1997)63 in three village in Kilosa District namely Ilongea, Msalalani and Msingisi revealed that all the 3 villages lacked certificates of titles land is governed by virtue of the district and the village councils.
The situation found in Kilosa is similar to what found in Ngorongoro. Villagers have only derivative rights only to use land not to own land this is the great source of conflicts. In Ngorongoro only 2 villages out of 37 villages possess the certificate of land ownership these are Ololosokwan and Engaresero.The rest of the area are not surveyed or planned for multiples uses.
The range land act of 1973 and village and Ujamaa village act of 1975 both aimed at eliminating customary rights through process of law.
The latter category of conflicts is caused almost entirely by disputes about village boundaries. As villages seek to plan the use of their land, they reserve specific areas for different purposes such as dry season grazing areas. Conflicts arise when pastoralists from neighboring villages seek to have access to such reserved areas in contravention of village land use plans or without the authority of respective village councils. Such village land use plans often change the traditional pattern of access to land, and in the absence of wide consultations across villages, they become a basis for conflict with those who still ascribe to traditional mechanisms of land use.
In practice however, disputes about village boundaries often interface with traditional rivalries between different sections, as appears to be the case between Arash and Piyaya or Soitsambu and Oloipiri.64 Where such traditional rivalries do not exist, neighboring villages are able to reach agreements on the use of land with relative ease.
However, such conflicts are routinely dealt with through traditional dispute resolution and conflict management mechanisms involving elders, traditional institutions, systems and practices.
Apart from conflicts that can be traced to historical rivalries, there are new forms of conflict arising within Maasai society as a result of modern influences and practices.
With break down of traditional practices and penetration of global economics forces to the local level such conflicts in many society as for spatial differences are concerned
Human population increases
Increasing demand for agricultural land and increasing conflicts between farmers and pastoralists
Uncertainty and confusion in land tenure in many rural areas
Increasing pressure to make land available for investment purposes following liberalization of the economy
The need to regulate land transactions through a market in land
Increasing disputes over land tenure and ownership

3.04 Natural Resource Curse
Ngorongoro District is the richest District in Tanzania in terms of natural resources but surprisingly the district is leading in resource based conflicts and poverty. In 1987 NLUPC from Dar es Salaam prepared land use plan for Loliondo Division but was not gazetted. The land was to be divided into land allocation for cultivation, pastoralism and conservation.
As stated earlier, the majority of Tanzanians live far below the “poverty line” earning less than US $ 1 per day; Remember the average income per capita is obtained by an arithmetically equal distribution of wealth, which no Utopia is expected to achieve.
This is a parasitic stratum. It strengthened tour and travel companies in the same way in which local communities are weakened. It is polarisation of wealth and poverty at two opposite extremes. It is all sheer robbery, criminal plunder of the weak by the strong. To borrow the late Dr. Rodney’s (1970: 254) phrase, “capitalism is parading in without even a loin cloth to cover its nakedness.”
Condemnation of pastoralists and cultivators as simply trouble-mongers who must be dealt with, has never ceased since 1992 when the Rio Conference 65came up with the CBC philosophy ,Principle 21 emphasizes that in sustainable development everyone is a user and provider of information. For example, Dr. Jafar Kideghesho of Wildlife Management at Sokoine University of Agriculture has written a number of papers clamouring for CBC. Yet he writes, “Habitat degradation attributable to severe overgrazing by livestock was the major cause for the decline. The eviction of Maasai pastoralists from the reserve [Mkomazi] in 1988 reversed the situation by lessening the degradation and thus restoring the conducive environment for wildlife species” (Kideghesho, 2001).66 He does not seem to have even a clue that eviction of people from their land, under any cover, is a “gross violation of human rights.” Praising such crimes should not come from someone who is trumpeting for CBC, this is what Stoclohm Declaration67 and Arthur Convention68 provide against.
In reference to the Ramsar Site Convention 197169 the lake Natron area was declared to be Ramsar site without peoples concern and hence became a threat to presence of pastoralist living around the lake on their jurisdiction and sovereignty over natural resources.
The director of wildlife has more power to grant concession for exclusive hunting rights without involving villagers .Practically this has taken place in Loliondo where the whole Loliondo Game Controlled area was granted to OBC and left indigenous as squatters on their land. OBC hunting activities have long struggled to get accommodated within traditional grazing patterns of pastoralists in the area, which struggle has at times precipitated into sore relationships and open conflicts. The land leased to OBC and the other sold to Thomson Safari in Loliondo are seasonal migrated corridors. The same situation was found taking place in Sudan whereby most of the pastoralist seasonal migrated corridors were granted to investors from U.A.E, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.70
The Ngorongoro Conservation Authority (NCA) occupies more than a half of the District land (59%). All people within the conservation area have no right of ownership and even villages are not recognized.
Mount Lengai and Lake Natron Game controlled have been hunted by NCA, WMA and hash Project companies.The erosion of pastoralist land to the hand of outsiders did not cease, currently Thomson Safaris an American company possess 12000 acres of pastoralists grazing land.
Box 1: the uses proposed for farm No. 373 in Soitsambu71
2250 acres shall be used for campsites in several areas
1500 acres will be used for building Tourism Hotel and Lodge
500 acres will be used for building cultural Bomas to the residence
250 acres shall be used for curio shops
7500 acres are for game driving and walking
200 acres for staff village
OBC has not only impinged on Maasai grazing rights, the company has attempted to restrict freedom of human movement regardless of the presence of cattle. In 1998, OBC erected a gate on the only road to the northern part of LGCA. They controlled access to the road. Those living north of Loliondo town needed special permission to go through the gate; otherwise, they would have to take a route that was twice as long. The road was finally opened in 1999, after the matter being taken to the parliamentary debates.
This reality has prompted a number of studies and investigations over conflict in Ngorongoro in recent years, mostly by development partners, students and civil society or organizations active in the district or concerned with pastoralism, development and conflict management.
It is not at all surprising that resource-based conflicts should constitute one of the major development challenges in Ngorongoro. Indeed, this is consistent with the reality all over the dry lands of Africa where conflict has become endemic. In a global review of pastoralism and conflict, have shown how areas occupied by pastoralists are characterised by conflicts emanating from competition for natural resources72. In a sense the survey does no more than update and confirm what previous studies, including those by Kratli and Swift,73 already concluded and asserted: that competition for access to range resources leads to conflict among pastoralists and between them and other livelihoods and land use systems that seek the use of the same resources.
Major challenges to the security of pastoral land tenure include expansion of agriculture, oil and mineral extraction, tourism-driven conservation policies, and Western notions of private property and resource ownership, which promote individualization and privatization of pastoral commons.
In response to pressures for privatization and individualization, Governments, including that of the United Republic of Tanzania, have often implemented sweeping changes in land tenure with the support of international donors, particularly the World Bank.
The situation in Ngorongoro District is defined by competition for access to land and natural resources underpinned by competing land uses and livelihoods. The land use competition, which often translates into conflict, can be classified into four major categories, namely:74
Although of a much smaller scale, there are also conflicts in Ngorongoro which pit pastoralists against pastoralists. Such conflicts occur either between different sections of the Maasai community, for example between the Purko and the Loita or between Laitayok and Purko.
The former category of conflicts is explained largely by historical rivalries which create latent animosity capable of flaring up into violence at the
slightest excuse. It is difficult with such latent rivalries to distinguish between instances where individual differences are “communalized” by either side to feed their historical differences and instances of real inter-sectional disputes or conflicts. There is a clear tendency in such cases for individual differences, especially where they result in any form of violence to be enlarged into communal conflicts as both parties mobilize the support of their families and relatives

3.05 Privatation, Acquisition and Investment Policy.
Potkanski 75 says From the 1990s onwards, land disputes between settled agricultural and mobile pastoral people have become more common in Tanzania. These land disputes have been due to land alienation and multiple allocations of land/resource rights on village lands.
From the end of the 1980s this has been the case especially in Tanzania, in the Districts of Monduli, Kiteto and Siman-jiro,Kilosa and Usangu. Conflicts occurred in places where large-scale agriculture and/or mining rights have been granted to private investors by the State. In Arusha Region underlying causes to conflict include both territorial issues and property claims where the access and control to critical resources has been very important. Conflicts on village lands have developed when State authorities have favored land allocations to cultivators at the expense of the pastoralists or offered to investors at the expense of pastoralists.
In land disputes, villagers use territorial strategies to guard their village land and property rights against encroachment by “outsiders’
The village Land Act makes it legally for village lands to be alienated to non village private investor it has a potential for further approbation of common land and privatization .76
Chachage and Shivji (2001) 77concede that liberalization has prompted high marginalization of the rural poor as a lot of pieces of land are being alienated from peasants and pastoralists. Thus causing conflicts over natural resources. This was possible because when they move elsewhere in order to secure for forming and grazing are, they cause conflict with people they meet, we have at hand live examples at Rufiji, Ihefu, Kilosa and lindi.
Shivji and Kapinga78 states that a number of controversial alienation have justified over past few years in forms of promoting investment and attracting foreign investment and attracting foreign investor land has been alienated to hoteliers for purpose of tourism in and around National parks as will as on prime beach later.
We currently have great conflicts with hoteliers at Ngorongoro who wants to build hotels almost every where at conservation area while the laws prohibits indigenous to build modern buildings. Also exclusive hunting right granted to outsider like (OBC) in loliondo all these is evident from discussions with villagers and other stakeholders in the District, that a major cause of conflict between conservation related investors and local communities in the district is the information gap that surrounds the grant of licenses to the investors, the terms under which the licenses are granted, and the benefits that communities are supposed to get from the operations.
A key cause of this situation is the lack of clarity about the legal status of the land and the relative powers and responsibilities of the central government and the village authorities regarding the management of access to the land for purposes of conservation related investments. A key example is OBC in 1992 was granted the land without people’s consultation and District council signed on behalf of villages. The above act of District councils amounts to violation of constitutional rights. 79 The situation is further complicated by the multiplicity of policy, legal and institutional mandates surrounding the Loliondo Game Controlled Area.
The allocation of hunting blocks is done by the Director of Wildlife in exercise of powers that are not clearly regulated under the Wildlife Conservation Act. In fact, complaints have been raised to the effect that “in practice, the allocation of hunting blocks has reflected the Director's personal whim rather than the consistent application of” guidelines.80 While such complaints come from professional hunters and hunting companies, which feel that there is inadequate clarity about the criteria for the granting of hunting licenses and the allocation of hunting blocks, they in part reflect the information gap referred to above. The entire process takes place in Dar es Salaam without any reference to the local communities. In particular, village councils complain that they are never consulted even though the operations of the hunting blocks ultimately touch on lands that fall under their mandates within the meaning of the Village Land Act.81
Loss of Land though Government acquisition and creation of conservation areas and game reserves have deprived people’s Land. Such measurers have created Land less mobile pastoralists and farmers. Shivji (1998)82 says Government leaders serve only government interests and policies and put aside majority interest.
At another level, the competition for tourist business is feeding on old animosities and creating more conflict. Moreover, there are now claims that some tour operators are using villagers to fight their competitors83. During the Soitsambu village assembly on August 2008 I managed to attend the meeting and noted some grievances as follows: one old man named Oletoroge complained “we are not ready to live with Investors like OBC and Thomson but our fellow Laitayok have been corrupted to sale the land” In fact, the ongoing dispute between Thomson Safaris and the village of Soitsambu is explained in some quarters by reference to competition between tours operators, as those with existing businesses seek to protect their turfs.
Lack of community participation in land use planning and zoning for different use is the main source of conflicts Shiviji (1998). The central focus of the large majority of complaints received of concision on land was not considered (hatushirikishwi) that was a constant cry. The result of that to people will take law in their own hand to raid and killing one other.
Peter Maina84 says the 1997 Tanzania investment Act has some glaring weakness like liberation of economy hailed as policy that will open avenues through which the local and foreign investors would walk together to prosperity but this has not been achieved because the law is silent on the joint ventures and obligations to investors.
3.06 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
There is a lack of conflicts management in multiple resources user. This should be resolved by mix institutions comprised both customary and formal system.
LC (1994) has indicated that there are many authorities dealing with land matters. This has brought more problem than even before because there is no clear authority dealing within land matter especially in areas with multiple land use and resources like Ngorongoro. Investigation comes out and revealed that people with land dispute don’t send their cases anywhere for deliberation this is because of lack of clear authority to deal with land matters. Courts do not resolve many land problems.
Mwamfupe and Mg’ong’o said85, the persistence of open clashes in many
villages of Kilosa District for example is an indication of the weaknesses in the reconciliatory bodies. In Kambala village, for example, Maasai pastoralists complained of biased judgments that favor crop cultivators. As one pastoralist put it “Only in one case out of 10 will a Maasai win a dispute against crop cultivators”. On the other hand,
however, crop cultivators argue that pastoralists are, in most cases, the main
offenders as echoed by one villager “It is very rare that crop cultivators invade the Maasai’s grazing lands”.
Also some complainants cannot afford to report their complaints to courts. This is because courts are not easily accessible to ordinary people. Also poor behavior of leaders who lack accountability, people loose trust on the Government machinery and it is bureaucrats at various levels. The gross negligence in settling lands use conflicts has led to the persistent of conflicts for long time without any solution. Kapinga (1995)86 says these include undermine of local tenure arrangement land appropriation and misuse of leadership position to grab land.
The experience and discussions with key informants in the study villages further revealed that the machinery used to solve conflicts helped the growth of the conflicts .For instance in 2004 the District high leadership and Police force was condemned of arresting only one side of the fighting groups,the prisoners were the Maasai leaders ;Tadei Olekoiye (ward councilor) and others.
The traditional institution and methods used in Maasai and Barbeig shows that the traditional conflicts resolution processes with society in Tanzania have capacity to have conflicts solved.
Maina (supra) says the major weakness of Tanzania investment Act is the lack clear dispute mechanism for dealing with disputes arising out of investment , it addresses only foreigners and local investors totally excluded .It also silence on the conflicts that arise between the foreigners and indigenous.
Police as enforcement organ is condemned for not being strategic in curing the problem but we can’t blame the Police force because their role in solving conflicts in Loliondo is basing on temporal measurers, only to cool the dispute but not to end the animosity.
3.07 Villagization
Maganga (1995), Shivji (1994), Mvungi and Mwakyembe (1994)87 discussed problem of villagization at different perspective. Said to bring land struggle as well as conflict of various magnitudes to coexist side by side with statutory ownership and incompatible differences modes of economy were more mixed than ever before, exacerbation resource use conflicts.
Maganga (1995) says, thus happened because villagization was carried out without any enabling legislation, therefore this alteration lead conflicts and endless disputes. In other words one of the fundamental contradictions of villagization in Tanzania appears to be that of aggravated lands use conflicts and pressure and weakening institutional capacity in solving those conflicts.
Operation Vijiji was carried out without any enabling legislation under the premise that since all the land could be allocated and re-allocated without legal consequences.Shivji (1994) Says;
“Re-allocation and settlement was affected through the use of force. Allocation of the villages was done by executive bodies such as DC, RC no one new what legal refine will govern them.
The National Land Policy -1995 and Land Act -1999
Land Act was drafted and reaffirmed land continue to be vested in the President and will be regulated on his behalf by the commissioner for lands. But there is no difference with previous land refine. The only departure was to assert that “Land has value” “become a market commodity”.The same thing to Village Land Act 1999 provides for possibility of adjunctions and titling of village lands within village lands but under supervision and ultimate power.
Tenga -1987(Supra) suggested that an important condition for resolving the apparent conflict over land is to change land use and management policies land laws should allow individual or groups to establish exclusive rights over land .
Sanna Ojalamm(Supra) says in social native space, zoning policies have also caused increased tenure insecurity and uncertainty of property due to land alienation, which has led to varied land disputes in different places.

3.08. Overlapping of Laws
Existence of numerous pieces of land legislation.
Sanna Ojalammi(Supra) says when thinking about law, it is also important to remember that Africa has often had two parallel legal systems functioning at the same level: state law and customary law. Also, overlap-ping land claims (modern and customary) have existed side by side in social space. Customary law/tenure has functioned at the level of peoples’ communities and statutory law has operated on the national level.
Mr. Nelson of Sand County Foundation presented an apparent contradiction in the legislation with respect to Game Controlled Areas and village lands. Game Controlled Areas are created by the Wildlife Conservation Act88, and according to the Land Act is therefore included under the definition of reserved lands.89 At the same time, Game Controlled Areas in northern Tanzania overlap with demarcated and registered village lands and are therefore included under the Village Land Act’s definition of village lands.
Mr. Stolla stated that the legislation did not intend land to be both reserved and village lands, and that this was a contradiction and a flaw in the laws.90 Concern was expressed as to the tenure security implications of this contradiction, and Mr. Stolla advised that the only recourse would be harmonization of the laws by Parliament.
One factor that brings about land conflict is existence of numerous pieces of legislation controlling deferent land resources that apart from contradicting each other, often clash with indigenous property management system hence result into insecurity to land tenure leading to unsustainable land use practices making policies as well as legislation over resources ineffective and irrelevant to actual situation (Maganga 1995)91
This study shows the multi-legal situation in Tanzania where land and resource property has accommodated notions of private, common/collective or granted rights in land ownership.
The Wildlife Conservation Act does not define a game-controlled area, and its provisions thereon are not very illuminating as regards the status of persons who live within these areas. The Act merely provides that the Minister may, by order in the Gazette declare any area of Mainland Tanzania to be a game controlled area92; and then places certain restrictions aimed at ensuring that animals are not trapped, wounded or killed.93 Such is the ambiguity about the import of these provisions that one hears claims among certain groups in Loliondo that the local people have no rights to the land on which they live. On the other hand, villagers in the area have applied for and obtained certificates of village land under the Village Land Act.94. Nevertheless, the multiple, policy, legal and institutional mandates of the Land Act, the Village Land Act and the Wildlife Conservation Act combined with the government’s aggressive pursuit of foreign investments in the wildlife sector add to the sense of insecurity and uncertainty that surrounds land rights in Ngorongoro district, and is one of the key factors engender resource-related conflicts in the area. Recently Serengeti National Parks (SENAPA) in collaboration with land surveyors from land ministry mercilessly grabbed the richest part of Ololosokwan Village pretending that they are adjusting parks borders. While the village certificate of ownership from the same ministry shows those areas belongs to the village95.
Juma and Maganga (2000)96 their studies on local resource management at Mbarali District in irrigated areas revels that water utilization (control and regulation) Act of 1979 and other piece of legislation that they have become source of land use conflicts it is therefore questionable whether or not system that ignore customary laws over resource appeal to people and will be implementable. Because those who were protected by customary law will not secure protection under new legal system.
The National Land Policy does not 'recognize, clarify, and secure in law' customary land Rights vs the wildlife conservation strategy predicated on the state's allocation of customary lands. On the contrary, it enables further dispossession of rural communities' lands. For example, the Land Policy recognizes overlapping and sometimes conflicting land uses, including wildlife use, in many districts such as Kiteto, Monduli and Ngorongoro. 'Some of the game controlled areas are critical habitats for wildlife and also form wildlife migration routes .Those areas have serious land use conflicts and Dispute.
In Tanzania we have Environmental Managements Act of 1997 which works simultaneously with Environmental sector Policy and Legislations like Forest law, Mining, Wildlife, Agriculture and Land laws. Therefore to avoid overlapping of any kind, all these laws must be properly implemented. This was recently manifested where the Deputy Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism under the coercive force of International environmental law insisted that we have to see people around Ngorongoro crater evicted to avoid threats from UNESCO.97 "We have already directed the Ngorongoro Authority to conduct census for both human population and livestock in the areas so that we can take appropriate measures”
4.01 The way forward
On the basis of the foregoing analysis and findings, the following interventions are recommended as a way of addressing the conflicts in Ngorongoro:
Establishment of a District-wide conflict management framework which incorporates all the major stakeholders, especially central and local government, traditional leadership and institutions, civil society, the private sector and religious organizations, and ensures the effective participation of men, women and youth, if the initiative could be enlarged beyond its present focus on humanitarian crises, and to incorporate traditional mechanisms of conflict management and dispute resolution.
A comprehensive education and awareness creation exercise should constitute a core part of this strategy to confront and address different aspects of conflict in Ngorongoro, including historical rivalries and perceptions that derive from them, prejudice, especially as between the Batemi and the Loita, enhancing awareness about land and natural resources policy and law and land rights. Students in schools should be skilled to live as one and united.
Systematic and comprehensive resolution of disputes regarding village boundaries in the District in order to bring closure to this long-standing issue.This need to be done by making sure all villages are surveyed and posses certificate of ownership.
Participatory land use planning at the Village and District levels with the informed participation of all villagers and the relevant institutions. In particular, such land use planning should be informed by and take into account historical access to common property resources across villages and even districts.
Reconcile natural resource management and development policy and institutional imperatives with pastoralism and reduce the perceived hostility of key policy actors in the District to pastoralism as a land use and livelihood system. A key issue in this regard is the need for an improved understanding of pastoralism among key policy actors in the District and people should be seen benefiting from resources.
Find a lasting solution to the pending land claims whether through court action, negotiated settlement (ADR) or government intervention. Leaving these claims pending for long periods only serves to perpetuate feelings of hostility between the protagonists, and encourages impunity in some quarters.
To cure the problem of porous border between Tanzania and Kenya Government should enact laws which can accommodate the problems arising from the border of Loliondo category where one clan extends to neighboring country. Customs and immigration offices need to be established at Loliondo.
The Government should improve the capacity law enforcement organ to confiscate firearms held illegally.
4.02. Conclusions.
Conclusively the above study reveals the real situations taking place in Ngorongoro. The district is notorious of the above categories of resource based conflicts, and the escalation of violence in the district has been precipitated by Laws and National Policies operating over the whole District. A number of factors such as proliferations of firearms , natural resource curse, overlapping of laws ,lack of land use planning, lawlessness, porous boundaries, evictions, investment activities, poor dispute settlement mechanisms have been found to be the main reasons for persistence nature.

1 comment:

Blogger said...

Using RentalCars you can discover affordable rental cars at over 49,000 locations globally.